The Effects of Demographic Trends on Consumption, Saving and Government Expenditures in the U.S. by Michael D. Hurd
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC









Financial support from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnershipis gratefully
acknowledged. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Aging. Anyopinions
expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureauof Economic Research.NBER Working Papa #4601
December 1993
THE EFFECFS OF DEMOGRAPHIC




This paper reviews and analyzes forecasts of the Social Security mist funds, government
spending, medical expenditures. and other elements of aggregate income and spending.
According to these forecasts, the aging of the U.S. population will require some increases in taxes
to support the retirement system. It should reduce the saving rate, and the composition of output
Will change. By themselves, these changes seem manageable. However, the direct effects of
aging are completely dominated by the projected increases in medical expenditures. Although
medical costs interact with aging, most of the increases are not related to aging. Even the
moderately high forecast of medical spending will require that all increases in output between
now and 2020 be devoted to the consumption of medical services, allowing no increasein any
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Thedeveloped countries are allforecastto have a demographic change to older
populations. The change is the combined result of the temporarily high fertility rates
thatproduced the baby boom andfallingmortality rates that both increasedthe
probability of livingto65 andincreasedlife expectancy at 65. Table 1 shows the
percentage of the population aged 65 or over (elderly) in seven developed countries and
projected percentages. Thepercentageisexpected to increase from 12% in 1990 to 16%
in 2020. Compared with some other countries the change in the U.S. is rather modest:
forexample, the percentage is expected to increase from 11% to 21% in Japan.
In the U.S. after 2020 the fraction of the population over age 65 is expected to
increase further as thebabyboom generation fully ages past65.However, thegrowthin
the oldest-oldpopulation(85 or over) is expected to be much larger: the percentage of
the population 85 or over is forecast to double by 2020 and increase by 275% by 2040
(Advisory Council, 1991a).
Thesedemographicchangesmay have profoundeffects onthe economy because
the economic behavior of the elderly is very different from the nonelderly. The most
obviousdifferenceis in their labor force participation: an older population will have
fewerworkersper person,andso,cetpar.,the economywillhaveloweroutputper
person.The elderly tend to dissave whereas the working-age population saves. Thus, an
older population willhavea lower saving rate.The patternofconsumption by the
cldcrly is different:theyconsume more medical services and less privatetransportation.But to the extent these goods are purchased in a normally functioning market, the
economy should accommodate to a change in the pattern of consumption. In the U.S.
theelderly are substantially supported by the government through the tax and transfer
system, in particular throughSocialSecurity (the public pension system in the U.S.),
through Medicare (the government health insurance system for the elderly), and through
Medicaid (the government health insurance system for the poor, whose primary users are
the elderly). Therefore, part of their income and some of their consumption do not arise
from market transactions, but from taxation and subsidized spending. Not only may
there be deadweight losses from this system, but an aging population will require
increasing taxation, which may strain the political consensus underlying the programs.
Thus, the future of the Social Security system has been questioned.
This is especially troubling for the elderly because of the importance of Social
Security income. Table 2 shows the sources of income of the elderly in the U.S. 93% of
households in which an elderly person lived received Social Security income, compared
with just 31% with income from private pensions.' Social Security accounts for 38% of
the total income, but the distribution of income is such that it is much more important to
some households than this figure would suggest. The fraction of households with more
than 20% of their income from Social Security is 0.82; the fraction with more than half
of their income from Social Security is 0.55. That is, more than half the households have
more than half of their income from Social Security. These figures suggest thanany
uncertainty about the future of the Social Security system is a matter of concern to the
elderly.
2The goal of this paper is analyze some projections of the U.S. economy to the
year 2020. The main focus will be the effects of population aging arising from
compositional effects and fromincreasedlife expectancy at age 65. However, in the U.S.
the effects of rapidly rising medical expenditures interact with an aging population and
dominate the composition of consumption and government spending in the year 2020, so
they are the subject of considerable analysis. The analysis will find the effects on
households, firms, and government, and how the effects interact at the macro level.
2. Social Security Administration Forecasts.
The Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration makes detailed
forecasts of the future of the Social Security system. The greatest effort is made for the
demographic variables, principally fertility rates and mortality rates, because in the long
run, trends in demographics have the greatest impact on the system. Earnings,
unemployment, inflation, and other macro variables are also forecast, and these variables
enter a complicated forecasting model which incorporates the Social Security law. The
results are forecasts of income and expenditures of the Social Security system, as well as
a great number of other variables. These forecasts will be the basis of the analysisof
this section.
2.1. Demographic aspects of the Social Security forecasts.
3There are three groups of forecasts.Forecast I is a high income-low cost
projection based on assumptions of high fertility and low increases in life expectancy.
Forecast HI is a low income-high cost projection based on low fertility and high increases
in life expectancy. Forecast II, which is normally used, is a medium level projection.
The forecasts depend critically on the assumptions about fertility and mortality.
Table 3 has summaries of the main assumptions. Between I and III, there is substantiai
variation in the assumptions, which has led many users of the forecasts to assume that I
and III bound the possible outcomes. However, there is no reason tosuppose this. For
example, Manton, Singer and Stailard, 1993, and Vaupel, 1993, have population
forecasting models that under some circumstances predict much larger elderly
populations than the population under III.
Table 4 has life expectancies conditional on reachingage 65. The fiscal stability
of the Social Security system depends critically on conditional lifeexpectancy: a 1%
increase in life expectancy at 65increasesexpected costs by 1%. There is considerable
variation between I and Ill: for example, lifeexpectancy of females in 2040 is 20%
higher under III than under I. This implies that costs will be 20% higher.
We cannot assess the reasonableness of the demographicassumptions that
underlie the forecasts by comparing the predictions with actualoutcomes because we
have not observed the process for enoughyears. However, if the forecasts vary
considerably from year-to-year, it would suggest that even small amounts of new
information have large impacts on the forecasts. This, inturn, would suggest that the
forecasts are not very reliable. Table 5comparesforecasts to the years 2000, 2020 and
42040 of life expectancy at age 65. The forecasts were made in 1989 and 1993 so we can
see how theforecastsevolved with new information. Especially for III there were rather
large declines predicted in life expectancy. Take 2000 for example. The forecast of life
expectancy of women 10 years in the future changed by about 3% in just four years.
Although we cannot compare the demographic forecasts with actual outcomes, we
can compare some of the economic forecast with outcomes because of the shorter time
scale. Table 6 summarizes such a comparison for 4-year-ahead forecasts of sonic
economic variables. The table gives the number of observations (comparisons between
predicted and realized outcomes), the percentage of the realizations that fell between the
I and III forecasts, the percentage that were exactly the same as either I or ifi (on the
boundary) and the percentage outside the range bounded by I and III. For example,
there were 11 comparisons of the actual unemployment rate with the 4-year-ahead
forecast unemployment rate. 36% of the realizations fell within the range given by I and
III, 18% were equal to the I or 111 forecast, and 46% fell outside the range. Therefore,
one would estimate that I and III form a 36% confidence interval for 4-year-ahead
forecasts of the unemployment rate. From this point of view, it is apparent that I and III
do not form high-level confidence intervals of forecasts of the economic variables.
Whether this will prove to be true for the demographic variables will be seen in 20 or 30
years, but in the meantime we should probably not treatI and UI as giving high-level
confidence bounds. Although I will not repeat this caution later in this paper, it should
be assumed that I have this in mind.
The assumptions about fertility and mortality, along with other economic and
5demographic assumptions are used in a complicated forecasting model to find future
income, costs and so forth,andthe number of Social Security beneficiaries and the
number of workers paying into the system (covered workers). The ratio of beneficiaries
to covered workers is important because it gives the number of retirees each worker
supports through the Social Security tax and transfer system. Table 7 shows that even
under II, the intermediated forecast, the ratio rises from 0.30 to 0.41 in 2020 to 0.51 in
2040. Without any other accompanying changes the implication is that the tax rate on
each worker will have to be raised substantially. Under III the ratio increases to 0.62 by
2040, implying that the tax rate would have to double.
2.2. Financial aspects of the Social Security forecasts.
The Social Security system is composed of three funds. They are:
The Old-Age Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Fund (OASDI).
This fund has two pans: Old-Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability
Insurance (DI). OASI primarily supports retired workers and theirspouses and
widows. It provides the old-age public pensions in the U.S., and it is what most
people think of when they refer to Social Security. DI supports disabled workers.
It is a much smaller program than OASI.
The Federal Hospital Insurance Fund (HI). This ispart A of the Medicare
6system, which provides health insurance to the elderly.
The Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Fund (SMI). This is part
B of theMedicaresystem. It differs from HI in that the retired elderly voluntarily
pay a premium to be enrolled. The premium is normally set to cover 25%ofthe
cost of the program with the other 75% of cost coming from general Treasury
funds. Almost all elderly subscribe to SM!.
The financial status of OASDI and HI is generally stated in terms of the income
rate and the cost rate. The income rate is the percentage of the taxable payroll paid into
the funds through Social Security taxes.2 The cost rate is the percentage of the taxable
payroll paid in Social Security benefits. These are good measures because they are
invariant to scale effects aria if they differ, they directly show how tax rates would have
to change to balance the funds.
Table 8 has the income and cost rates under I, II and Ill, and the balance, which
is the percentage of annual expenditures in the fund. In 1991 the income rate was 12.6
and the cost rate was 11.0, indicating that the OASDI fund was accumulating monies at
the rate of 1.6% of taxable payroll. The balance in the fund was 83% of annual
expenditures.
Over the next 60 years the income rate is forecast to be approximately stable, but
the cost rate will increase. Under I, which is based on assumptions of high fertility and
high mortality, the fund remains positive over the forecast horizon, and even in 2040
7when the baby boom generation is aged 80-90, the cost rate is only marginallygreater
than the income rate.
Underlithe cost rateexceeds theincome ratesometime between 2015 and 2020
(notshown) but becauseofaccumulations the fund hasapositive balanceuntil sometime
between2040and 2045 (not shown). The changesrequiredto bring thefund into
balance are not particularly large: in 2020 the tax rate would have to be increasedby
1% of taxable payroll to match income with cost.
Even under III, which is based on low fertility andlowmortality, the tax increases
inthe early part ofthe forecast period are rather small: an increase of 3.0 in the income
ratewould make income and expenditures the same in 2020.
The long-run financial situation of the funds can be found from thesummarized
income and cost rates. These are the expectedpresent value of the income and cost
streams normalized by the expected present value of taxablepayroll. Over 1991-2040 the
summarized income rate under H is 13.l0and the summarized costrate is 13.80. This
means that the fund would just be in balance in 2040 if today the tax ratewere
permanently increased by 0.7% of taxable payroll. Even under III the summarized cost
rate is just 2.3% of taxable payroll higher than the income rate. Thesefigures indicate
that as far as the retirement part of SocialSecurity is concerned, the aging of the
population will increase costs, but the increase is manageable.
Table 9 has the cost rates for HI, and they havea rather different time path then
the cost rates for OASDI. (The income rate isconstant under current law at 2.90.)
Even under lIthe cost rate more than doublesby 2020. Under Ill, the increase is 7.9%
8of taxable payroll: this is larger than the increase under III in OASDI, even though
OASDI is a much larger program.3
Theincome and cost rates are normalized by taxable payroll, which is about 45%
of GNP. Table 10 shows OASDI andHIexpenditures under ii as a percentage of GNP.
What is striking ishow largetheincrease inNJ is forecastto be compared withthe
forecast for OASDI: by 2040 HI isforecast toconsume an additional 2.4% of GNP.
Eventhese forecasts areconservative,however, compared with some other expert
forecasts which J will discuss below.
3.Forecasts by the Expert Panel.
The 1991 Advisory Council on Social Security convened a panel of economists
andactuaries (the Expert Panel) tostudy theimpact of population aging on households,
government, firms and the macro economy. It was evident, however, that such a study
would be incomplete withoutconsideringthe evolution of health care costs becauseof
theirhigh rate of growth and because of the interactionbetweenhealth care costs and
population aging. This section will analyzesomeof the findings oftheExpertPanel.4
Thepanel requested that the HealthCareFinancing Administration (HCFA)
makefour forecastsor scenarios of health care costs. These forecasts used the main
demographicandeconomicassumptions ofthe Social Security Administration's forecast
II,but used assumptions abouttheevolution ofhealthcare costsdifferentfrom those
imbedded in I, II, and Ill. The four health care forecasts allwerebasedonforecasting
9the cost and use of 18 different types of hea]th
usebyage categories so theyincluded changes
composition. The main differences in the four
the assumptions about the real rate of inflation
use and intensity of use holding age constant.3
Table 11 gives examples of the differences in assumptions and use for the four
forecasts. Scenario 1 is the highest cost forecast. It assumes that the real rate of health
care inflation from 1970 to 1990 (1.4%) will continue to 2000 and then fall to 1.2%. The
rate of increase in real consumption per person will continue at the 1970-1990 rate
(4.7% per year). Scenario 2 is the same as I except that the rate of increase inper
capita consumption falls to about 4% after 2000. Scenario 3 has lower rates of inflation
and "increase in use than have been observed over the last 20years. The assumptions
about health care costs in 3 are approximately thesame as those in SSA's I, II and III
forecasts discussed in section 2. Scenario 4 has no real medicalcost inflation and no
increase in use or intensity given age. That is, it shows the effects ofpopulation aging
only.
In 1990 about 12.2% of GNP was consumed in medicalexpenditures. By 2020
this is forecast to rise to 36.0% under scenario1,31.5% under 2,22.7% under 3 and
13.7% under 4. A comparison of 4 with the otherscenarios shows that most of the
increase in these scenarios comes fromassuming that past increases in cost and use will
continue into the future: holding real prices, andage-adjusted use and intensity of use
per person constant, spending for medical care will increase by just 1.5% of GNP. This
10
care resources. They all were based on
in cost due to changes in age
scenarios come from the differences in
of medical services and about the rate ofis the cet.par.aging component.Ofcourse,increasing pricesand use ofmedicalservices
alongwith population aging will have effects that are greater than the marginal increases
becauseof interactions. Here the increases are great enough that the interactions are
notjust second-order effects.
Itis alreadyclearthat scenario 3and possibly2 arenotwildly improbableand
that scenario4willbe a substantialunderestimate.Theestimate of1993 medicalcare
expendituresis 14% of GNP compared with 12,2% in 1990. If this rateofincrease
continues until2000,medical care expenditures will be about 19% of GNP, which is
larger thanunder any ofthe scenarios.
Inthe rest of the paper I willgiveoutcomesunderscenarios 2 and 3. Neitherthe
panel norI thought, however,thatthey necessarily bound themedical care expenditure
outcomes. The other forecastingassumptions(unemployment, general inflation,
demographicsand so forth) are those of SSA's forecast II.
3.1.Impact onGovernment
Table12 has OASDHIincome andcost rates forthe twoscenarios. Incomeis
roughlyconstant, but costsincrease substantially: evenunder3the tax rate wouldhave
to increase by6.7% ofpayroll. As we have already seen, only minority part of this is
causedby OASDI(2.9%in Table 8, II).
The impactongovernmentalbudgets fromincreasing healthcarecosts and
demographicsis shown in Table 13. Itshowsa declinein federal governmentpurchases.
11This is caused by a decline in defense spending from 5.8% ofGNPto 3.9% and some
decrease in spending for education resultingfrom the changingage structure of the
population. These decreases more than offset an increase in direct expenditures for
health care by the federal government. Of course, the increases in OASDI and HI are
much greater than the fall in government purchases so that the total federal budget as a
percentage of GNP will increase. A larger fraction of the federal government budget
will be transfers rather than direct purchases.
Under either scenario, state and local government spending will increase due to
higher medical care expenditures even though there is some offset from reduced
education expenditures.
3.2. Impact on Households.
Average real income of elderly households is forecast to increase by 47% by 2020,
mainly due to increases in Social Security benefits and pension income. Income of
nonelderly households is forecast to increase by 39%. When combined with the growing
elderly population, these forecasts imply that a substantially greater fraction of the
income in the economy will go to elderly households, about 10.6% compared with 7.4%
in j9g96
Medicalexpendituresby househo]ds will rise substantially under either scenarios 2
or3.Table 14 shows out-of-pocket medical care expenditures expressedasa percentage
ofmedian before.tax income. In 1989acouple with median income would have spent
12about 17% of its income on out-of-pocket medical expenses.Asthe table shows this
percentage is expected to growsubstantiallyto 30% under scenario 2 and 23% under
scenario 3. Expenditures are expected to grow even more for singles.
A major component of medical care expenditures by households is the premium
for SMI, even though the premium is only 25% of actual cost. Current law establishes
the SMI premium for each year until 1995. The first part of Table 15 shows what the
premium would be in 2020 if there is no change in the law, and it shows that the
premium would cover a small fraction of actual costs. Because the historical aim has
been that the premium cover 25% of costs, as it did in 1989. the second part of the table
shows the premium should it cover 25% of SMI costs. This is probably more relevant.
The premium will increase under scenario 3 by 359% real, and will require 7% and 9%
of the median incomes of couples and singles. If this expenditure is added to the out-of-
pocket of Table 14, under scenario 3 costs for couples will increase from 20% of median
income to 30% and of singles from 25% to 38%. This seems like a large burden indeed.
3.3. Impact on Firms.
Firms will have increase liabilities for pensions because of the demographic
changes, but unless coverage expands greatly the increased burden should be no more
than what we have seen for OASDI. Furthermore, pension growth has been in defined
contribution pians, which place no liability on the firm once the contribution has been
earned.
13However, firms will have substantial exposure to risksassociated withmedical
careexpenditures.Table 16 shows estimated medical care expenditurespaid for by
privateinsurance: per capita the increase under scenario 3 is 226%. In that about 80%
of medical insurance is associated with employment, firms can expect sharply higher
expenses for medical insurance. Of course, under this scenario, workers can expect that
most, ifnotall, of the growth in total compensation willbein fringe benefits to cover
medical expenses.
3.4. Impact in the Aggregate.
Sources of financing medical care expenditures should change. According to
Table 17, the percentage paid by Medicare will increase from 16.5% to 25.5% under
scenario 3, mainly the because of the demographic changes. Thisisequivalent to an
increases from 2% of GNP to 5.8% of GNP.Similarly, Medicaidwillincreaseto 3%of
GNP.Even though the fraction of total expenses paid by private insurance and out-of-
pocket will fall, they will still increase as a fraction of GNP because of the rapidincrease
in total medical costs. For example, private insurance willpay 6.7% of GNP in medical
care expenditures up from 4% in 1989.
The fraction of personal consumption by the elderly will change because of
demographic changes, income changes and for other reasons. To get a rough idea of the
magnitude, the panel divided the population into the elderly and nonelderly. The 1988
Consumer Expenditure Survey was used to find differences in theconsumption patterns
14of the two groups. If incomes do not change andconsumptionpatterns are fixed, the
population changes will indicate how consumption of different commodities will change
between the two groups. For example, the nonelderly consume more motor vehicles
than the elderly, so aggregate consumption of motor vehicles should fall as the
population ages. To account for income changes the panel assumed the income elasticity
of each commodity group was 1.0. Therefore, consumption by commodity group for each
age group can be forecast from the income and demographic forecasts of SSA's
projection II. Consumption of medical services is not forecast in this way; it comes from
the scenarios furnished by HCFA.
Table 18 shows the shares of personal consumption by the nonelderly and by the
elderly. In 1989, non-health consumption by the elderly was 12% of their total, which
was just their share in the population. However, they consumed 36% of the health care
services, mainly through the transfers in Medicare and Medicaid. These transfers are, of
course, not recorded as income; were they to be, the elderly would have a much larger
share of total income than indicated by money income. In total the elderly consumed
15% of private consumption in 1989.
In 2020 the elderly are forecast to be 16% of the population. They will consume
15% of non-health persona! consumption, but 45% of the health care services. This
increase is due to the demographic changes. In total under scenario 3 the elderly will
consume 21% of total personal consumption even though they will be just 16% of the
population.
With such large predicted increases in medical care expenditures, it is natural to
15wonder where the increased consumption will come from. To understand the magnitude
of the adjustment that would be required, the demands of government, consumption,
investment and the foreign sector were either forecast or assumed. For example, as
mentioned above, it was assumed that federal government purchases would fall from
7.7% of GNPto6.2% (Table 13, scenario 3). Personal consumption except for health
crc expenditures were calculated form the assumption of an income elasticity of 1.0.
Healthcare expenditures come from the HCFA scenarios. The foreign sector is
assumed to be in balance, and gross investment to return to its historic level of 13% of
GNP.
Table19 has the result of these forecasts and assumptions. Personal consumption
was 66.3% of GNP in 1989. 30.9% was in goods and 35.5 in services. Among
consumption of services consumption of housing was 14.3% of GNP and consumption of
medical services was about 8.4%. Government purchases were 19.7%, gross investment
was 14.8% and exports were -0.9%. Under scenario 3, personal consumption will
increase to 77% of GNP with most of the increase coming from higher medical care
expenditures. Government purchases and gross investment will fall slightly. Because
there is no residual category that makes total demand equal total supply, demand does
not have to equal supply, and indeed scenario 3 shows total demand at 108.9% of supply.
Under scenario 2 demand will be 116.6% of supply.
Of course, adjustments will bring supply and demand into equality. Oneway to
see the magnitude of the adjustments that will be required is tosuppose that medical
care expenditures, investment, government spending and the foreign sector demands are
16met; then, all the adjustment will have to come from non-health personal consumption.
Table 20 shows the allocation of per capita GNP under this assumption. Total per
capita ONP increases from$20,340to$27,890.Under scenario 2, $8790 willbe spenton
health care expenses, $1450 on education, and so forth. Non-health personal
consumption, the residual category, will be $10,990, which is less than the 1989 level.
That is, all thegrowthin per capita GNP between 1989 and 2020 (38%) will be used to
finance increases in medicalcareexpenditures. Jt is hard to see that this outcome will
be desired in the general population. Even under scenario 3, non-health consumption
grows at a much smaller rate than GNP.
Fromtwo persliectives an older population could be expected to have a lower
average saving rate than a younger population. In the firstperspective,increasing the
fraction of the population that is aged will increase the asset holdings of the aged
population. At a constant rate of asset decurnulation, a greater fraction of the savings of
the working-age population will be used to purchase the assets that the elderly are
selling. Thus, the average saving rate will fall.' In the second perspective, the life cycle
hypothesis of consumption implies that the working population saves and the retired
population dissaves; therefore, cer.par. increasing the fraction that is elderly should
reduced the saving rate out of income. Of course, these two perspectives are really two
ways of saying the same thing.
Table 21 shows estimates of the assets of elderly in 1989 and 2020, and the
resulting levels of asset decumulation. The most important assumption is about the rate
of dissaving: it is taken to be 2.9% of bequeathable nonhousing wealth. This figure is
17estimated fromobserved wealth changesof elderly households in the 1984 Survey of
Income and Program Participation(SlIP), Waves 4 and7(Hurd, 1991). The economy
wasrather stable during the mid-1980's so the rate of wealth change may well represent
the desired long-run rate of change. Furthermore, the 10-year averages from the
Retirement History Survey (3.2%) are very similar to the averages from SIPP even
though the economic conditions during the years of the Retirement History Survey
(1969-1979) were quite different. Other panel data sets give estimates that overall are
about this magnitude.8
In 1989, the elderly held about $1.6 trillion of nonhousing bequeathable wealth.
At a rate of dissaving of 2.9%, they sold $46 billion of assets, which was 2.2% of after-tax
earnings. Under the assumptions given in the table, nonhousing assets of the elderly will
grow to $3.7 trillion by 2020 and the elderly wilt decumulate at a rate of $107 billionper
year. This is 3.0% of after-tax earnings, requiring 0.8% more of household saving. Thus,
the household saving rate is projected to fall from 4.6% to 3.8%.
An alternative calculation based on saving rates out of income is the following:.
The average one-year rate of wealth decumulation in SIPPwas 2.9% from mean wealth
of $75.9 thousand, implying an excess of consumptionover income of $3.8 thousand. Net
income of the elderly in 1984 was $13,200 (Bureau of LaborStatistics, 1989), so the rate
of saving out of income by the elderly was -16.6%. I will take thisto be the desired or
steady-state rate of saving by the elderly. By assuming that the saving rates of the
elderly and nonelderly are stable over time, the effects of population agingon the
aggregate saving rate can be found simply by changing the weights on the saving rates of
18each group. In 1989 the elderly were 12% of the population and their average
household income was 62.3% of average household income of the population. The
household saving rate out of after-tax income was 4.6%. Therefore, the saving rate of
the nonelderly households was 6.3%. in 2020 the elderly are forecast to be 16% of the
population. Under the assumption that the average income of elderly households grows
by 47% and the income of nonelderly households by 38% (Advisory Council, 1991), the
aggregate household saving rate will fall by 0.7% to 3.9% of after-tax household income.
This is very close to the estimate from the method based on the change in asset holdings.
In view of the large variation over time in the household saving rate and the large
international variation, the fall in the household saving rate from 4.6% to 3.8% or 3.9%
does not seem like a large change.
4. Conclusion
Excluding increases in medical care expenditures, at least to the year 2020, the
aging of the population in the U.S.seemsto be manageable: the required increases in
Social Security retirement benefits will require some but not large tax increases; the
change in the mix of consumption is rather modest; the estimated effects on the
aggregate saving rate are within the bounds of historical variation. The effects beyond
2020 are greater, but they are not of crisis proportions. These demographic changes and
the increased requirements for retirement income are dominated by increases in
19spending for health care. Even the forecasts to 2020 probablycannot be realized
because of the required reduction in other spending.
Some of the reduction in other spending may be in saving and investment. We do
not know enough about saving determination at the household level to predict how a
large increase in medical care expenditures financed through Social Security taxation,
out-of-pocket and employers will affect saving rates; but it may noted that the fall in the
U.S.savingrate coincided with the large increase in health care spending.
20ENDNOTES
1.These are almost allassociated with previousemployment in the private sector.
2. The taxable payroll includes most earnings and has a maximum ($57,000 in 1993).
The combined OASI and DI tax rate is 6.20% paid by the employee and 6.20% paid by
the employer. A self-employed person pays both.
3. A comparison of the cost rates shows that HI is only about one-fourth the size of
OASDI.
4.I was a member of the panel, and I did some of the calculations reported in this
section, particularly on the macro economy and saving rates.
5. Intensity of use refers to the cost of a specific encounter with the health care system.
For example, holding prices constant a visit to a doctor may change because the visit
takes longer, or more procedures are used.
6. Note that these figures cannot be used to make utility comparisons because elderly
households are considerably smaller than nonelderly households, and because no
accounting is made of nonmoney income.
7. It is of independent interest to estimate the increase in the stock of assets that will be
put on the market as the population ages.
8. See Hurd, 1992, for other estimates.
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CanadaFranceGermany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
1990 11 14 16 14 11 15 12
2000 13 15 17 15 15 15 12
2020 19 20 22 19 21 16 16
Source:Advisory Council (1991a)Sources of Incom
Table 2














0.22 0.93 0.16 0.31 0.72 0.05
Fraction of total
income










0.09 0.55 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02
Source: Grad (1990)Table 3
Assumptions for Alternative SocialSecurityAdministration Demographic Projections
Alternative:
Fertility Rate (birthsperwoman) Age-adjusted death rate
I II III I II III
1990 2.05 2.05 2.05 785 792 800
2000 2.12 2.00 1.87 754 723 739
2020 2.20 1.90 1.60 714 633 560
2040 2.20 1.90 1.60 679 573 475







I II III I II III
1990 15.2 15.3 15.3 18.9 19.0 19.0
2000 15.3 15.9 16.4 18.9 19.6 20.2
2020 15.6 16.7 18.0 19.1 20.4 21.9
2040 15.9 17.5 19.5 19.5 21.3 23.5
Source: Trustees' Report,1991Table 5







1989 2000 15.0 18.9 15.6 19.6 16.2 20.4
1993 15.0 18.8 15.4 19.4 15.8 19.9
1989 2020 15.3 19.2 16.4 20.5 17.8 22.0
1993 15.2 18.9 16.320.2 17.4 21.5
1989 2040 15.7 19.6 17.121.4 19.3 23.7
1993 15.5 19.2 17.1 21.1 19.0 23.2
Source:Trustees' Reports, 1989 and 1993Table 6
Four-year-aheadForecasts: Percent between I and III, and outside of I and III
Unemployment
Observations Within On boundaryOutside Total
11 36 18 46 100
GNPchange 11 18 0 82 100
Wage change 9 33 0 56 100





1991 30 30 30
2000 29 31 32
2010 31 33 36
2020 37 41 46
2030 43 49 56
2040 42 51 62
2050 41 52 67
Source:Trustees'Report,1991JncomeRate, Cost
Table 8
Rate and TrustFund Balance,OASDI
I II Ill
IncomeCostBalanceTricomeCostBalanceIncomeCostBalance
1991 12.6 11.0 83 12.6 11.1 82 12.6 11.3 82
2000 12.6 9.7 303 12.7 10.9 229 12.7 12.3 139
2010 12.89.8 641 12.8 11.3 392 12.9 12.9 160
2020 12.9 11.8 769 13.0 14.0 387 13.1 16.1 60
2030 13.0 13.3 772 13.1 16.3 235 13.3 19.5 -
2040 13.0 12.8 844 13.2 16.6 40 13.4 21.1 .




1991 2.59 2.61 2.65
2000 2.99 3.52 4.16
2010 3.28 4.56 6.43
2020 3.73 6.20 10.50
2030 4.17 7.84 14.95
2040 4.37 8.55 16.93
2050 4.46 8.72 17.29
Source:Trustees' Report, 1991.
Note:Income rate is2.90Table 10




2000 4.7 1.6 6.3
2010 4.8 2.0 6.8
2020 5.8 2.7 8.5
2030 6.7 3.3 10.0
2040 6.6 3.6 10.2




Medical Expenditures: Sources of Growth, Historical and Projected
Scenario Percentreal Percent real perPercent ofGM'
medical capita medical (end of period)
inflation spending
1970-1980 0.3 4.1 9.1
1980-1985 2. 1 4.4
1985-1990 2.0 5.0 12.2
1990-2000
1.4 4.7 17.4
2 1.4 4.7 17.4
3 1.2 4.2 16.4
4 0.0 1.8 13.1
2000-2020
1 1.2 4.7 36.0
2 1.2 4.0-4.1 31.5
3 0.8-0.9 2.7-2.6 22.7
4 0.0 1.3-1.1 13.7
Source: Advisory Council, 1991aTable 12






Cost 13.7 22.9 20.4
Source: Advisory Council, 1991aTable 13






Purchases 7.7 6.5 61
H! & SM! 2.0 8.! 5.8
OASDJ 4.6 5.8 5.8
State & local 12.0 13.7 12.7
Source: Advisory Council, 1991aTable 14
Outof Pocket Medical Expenditures by the Elderly:






Singles 21 40 29




A. CurrentLaw 298 377 377
Annual premium(1988$)
PercentofSMI cost 25 7 10
B.Premiumcovers 25%ofcost
Annual premium(1988$) 298 1450 1070
Percentof medianincome
Couples 3 9 7
Singles 4 12 9
Source: Advisory Council, 1991aTable 16






Per capita (1990$) 854 2707 1930
Source: Advisory Council, 1991aTable 17
Sourcesof Funds for Medical Spending: Percent Distribution
2020
1989 2 3
Medicare 16.5 25.8 25.5
Medicaid 11.2 13.4 13.3
Other government 14.4 11.2 11.8
Private insurance 33.1 29.7 29.4
Out-of-pocket 20.5 16.2 16.3
Other private 4.4 3.7 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Totalmedical 12.2 31.5 22.7
(percent of GNP)








Under 65 88 85 35
65 orover 12 15 15
Health
Under 65 64 55 55





65 or over 15 23 21
Source: Advisory Council,1991aTable 19
Components of GNP (percent GNP)
2020
1989 2 3
Personal 66.3 83.8 77.0
consumption
Goods 30.9 31.5 31.5
Durable 9.1 9.7 9.7
Nondurable 21.7 21.8 21.8
Services 35.5 51.8 45.5
Housing 14.3 15.2 15.2
Medical 8.4 22.6 16.3
Other 12.9 14.1 14.1
Government 19.7 20.2 18.9
purchases
Federal 7.7 6.5 6.2
Health 0.4 1.1 0.8
Other 7.3 5.4 5.4
State & local 12.0 13.7 12.7
HealLh 1.4 3.7 2.6
Other 10.6 10.0 10.1
Gross Investment 14.8 13.0 13.0
Net exports -0.9 0.0 0.0
Totalpercent 100.0 116.6 108.9
Source: Advisory Council, 1991aTable 20
Adjustmentin PersonalConsumption:
Per Capita Allocation (1989$)
2020
1989 2 3
Health 2360 8790 6330
Education 1220 1450 1450
Government (exci. medical) 2600 3040 3040
Investment 3010 3630 3630
Non-health personal consumption 11080 10990 13450
Total 20340 27890 27890
Source: Advisory Council, 199 IaTable 21
Asset Decumulation and the Saving Rate
1989 2020
Amount Source Amount Source
Assets ofelderly t.6x10'2 A.C. 3.7x10'2 Calctilaiion
Asset decumulation 0.04x10'2 Calculation: 2.9% 0.10Th 1012 Calculation: 2.9%
rate of decumulation rate of decumulation
(Hard. 1991) (Hurd, 1991)
After-tax earnings 2.lxlO'2 A.C. 3.6x 1012 A.C.
Assetdecurnulation 2.2% Calculation 3.0% Calculation
out of after-tax
earnings
Household saving 4.6% A.C. 3.8% Calculation
rate
Source: A.C.= Advisory Council, 1991a
talculated as the product of 1989 assets, real per capita GNP growth of 1.01% per year and 1.8%
growth in the elderly population.